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"But Socrates not even Hercules could fight two people."
— Plato, Phaedo (89c)

The Catholic Educational Tradition

W

hat I intend with this presentation is, by no means, a
comprehensive treatment of the Catholic intellectual tradition.
Such a task is completely beyond my powers. Rather, I propose

a brief investigation of the main questions which arise when one places this
tradition in battle with its most important opponents. There are two main
opponents of the Catholic educational tradition. Pressing from the one side is the
classical educational ideal of the ancient Greeks. Bearing in from the other is the
contemporary liberal educational ideal.
The Catholic educational tradition has long seen itself as the further
development of the classical educational ideal. One sees this, for example, in
Dante's presentation of the noble Pagan philosophers in Limbo in the Divine
Com edy. The philosophers are, by no means, punished; rather they sit around in a

circle around their master Aristotle and engage in what is for them, in any case,
the absolutely best activity and the only one worthy of a man. They discuss
philosophical themes just as they imagine heaven to be.
"Raising my eyes a little space froni there, I saw the master of all that know,
among the teachers of philosophy; All look to him, all bend in honor low;
both Socrates and Plato I saw thus, before the others nearest him they
rrr\
go.

Dante sees the philosophers set apart from the sufferers in Limbo. Aristotle is,
naturally, in the place of honor but around him stand Plato and Socrates and, in
wider circles, other great philosophers of antiquity and the middle ages.
One could hardly conceive of an expansion of this group - undoubtedly,
clustered around Immanuel Kant — but including Jean Jacques Rousseau, Hegel,
Wilhelm von Humboldt, Benjamin Constant, Thomas Paine, John Stuart Mill,
Matthew Arnold, Alexis de Tocqueville, Alexander Herzen, Thomas E. Green,

^ Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy: Hell, translated by C.E. W heeler (London: J.M. Dent and Sons,

1911 ).
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Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, William James, George Herbert
Mead, John Dewey, W.E.B. DuBois, Hannah Arendt, Albert Camus, Richard Rorty,
Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls. The relation of the Catholic educational tradition to
the educational ideal of liberal modernity is much more strained than is its
relation to antiquity. The Catholic educational tradition, generally and most
conspicuously, sets itself against the liberal educational ideal.^
^ There are, of course, prominent exceptions. I can well recall the impression which my introductory
course in religion („Religion 101") at the Jesuit University in the United States in which I completed my
Undergraduate Studies. I was, first of all, very enthusiastic about the prospect of reading non-religious,
i.e. non-Catholic, authors (even if, as we will see with respect to our example, also non-adherents of the
standpoint of the liberal Enlightenment) and, specifically, Jean-Paul Sartre whose spiritual horizon
appeared to lack any relation to transcendence. Although one may well doubt in light of his
Autobiography and other evidence whether Sartre, in fact, operated in a completely secular world, the
literary figure which he depicts in Nausea, at least, appearance to be completely Godless. In addition,
Sartre was considered to be the main representative of Existentialism, a very influential cultural
movement in which many of my friends and acquaintances were already participating. Second, I was
relieved at not being forced to read any works of Catholic apologetics. True, at that age I could not
actually name any Catholic apologists (apart from Thomas Aquinas — but his position was not clear to
me since some regarded him as a philosopher as well as an apologist) but I was confident to be able to
identify an apologist should I prove unlucky enough to encounter one. Like Anytus in Plato's Meno, who
never actually met a Sophist but who was completely convinced that they were bad, and indeed, the
worst corruptors of Athens (op. cit., pp. 83-84 (91c-92d), I knew, as an undergraduate at Georgetown,
that Catholic apologists were bad and, above all, to be avoided. One was proud to attend a Catholic
University but did not want to be preached to by Catholic apologists! I regarded a sermon which aimed
at the conversion of the „Heathen"as nothing more than propaganda. I found the thought of such
efforts terrible and abhorrent. Third, I was curious whether the Jesuit priest who was my instructor in
Religion 101 would, in fact, be able to trace a (counter-historical!) path from the hopelessness (Aporia)
and almost schopenhauerian despair and misery of Sartre' Antoine Roguentin to the profession of faith
depicted in Book Eight of Augustine's Confessions. Although the path followed by the course designed
by my Jesuit teacher. Father Thomas King, took us from Sartre to Augustine, the way was not led by
Logos but only by a multiply dubious psychological comparison between the s'ennuyer of Antoine
Roguentin and the self torment of the young, pre-Christian Augustine. But precisely because of the
historical gap between Roguentin und Augustine and, above all, because of Historicism presupposed on
all sides, the relation between the two remained, in the end, one of difference. (Thomas King,
incidentally, published a book following the trajectory of his Introduction to Religion: Sartre and the
Sacred (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).
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In fact, I would content, the relation of the Catholic educational tradition is
equally opposed to the educational ideals of the ancients and moderns. The
difference, in my opinion, reduces to a certain confidence which the Catholic
tradition poses in relation to the ancients. This confidence is altogether lacking in
its relation to the moderns. There is no contemporary Thomas Aquinas to bring
the theses of the moderns into congruity with sacred doctrine.
The liberal Educational ideal, on its part, appears overtly hostile to the
Catholic educational tradition. In fact, there are countless expressions of animus
directed toward the Catholic educational tradition scattered through in the pages
of prominent liberal thinkers. For example, one finds the following passage in
Chapter II of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty:
"The most intolerant of churches, the Roman Catholic Church, even at the
canonization of a saint admits and listens patiently to a devil's advocate."
Even the most intolerant church that the world has ever seen,, writes Mill, — the
Roman Catholic Church — makes an exception to its usual claim to absolute
certainty in matters of faith in the case of a candidate to sainthood. The Church
does not regard it as self evident that someone is a saint. Rather the claim to
sanctity must pass through the crucible of cross-examination.'^
The hostility between liberal modernity and the Catholic tradition has a
long history. At the center of this conflict is the battle in France between the
Catholic Church backed Ancient Regime and the revolutionary devotees of the
enlightenment which culminated in the French revolution.^ The Roman church

^ John Stuart Mill, On Liberty in The Basic Writings o f iohn Stuart Mill. Edited by J.B. Schneewind (New
York; Modern Library, 2002), pp. 23-24 ("Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion").
By contrast. Mill does not say but leaves the reader to infer, the Church presumes certainty in the case
of heretics whom the inquisitor sentenced to death without the slightest hesitation. Cf. Kant, Religion
within the Limits o f Reason Alone. W erner Pluhar (trans.) (Indianapolis, Indians: Hackett Publishing
Company, 2009).
^ The French Revolution was, in fact, only the first of three blows which the Church suffered in the
Nineteenth century. In addition to the Revolution, one must mention the failed radical revolution of
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lost the battle in France and this defeat sent shock waves through the Catholic
ranks which still reverberate today. These echoes continue to disturb the relation
between the Catholic education and the liberal ideal and make any reconciliation
remote. At root, the Church conceives the Enlightenment doctrine of man as a
threat to its very existence.
By contrast, Catholic thinkers from Dante to the present have long
forgotten any hostility that might have existed between the Catholic tradition and
the educational ideal of antiquity. But, in fact, the critique put forward by some
pagan philosophers of late antiquity was at least as hostile toward Christianity as
are the liberal thinkers of our age. Nor was this hostility confined to philosophers.
Luke in his Acts of the Apostles tells of the hostile reception which Paul received
from the Athenian public.
"When they heard about the resurrection from the dead, some began to
mock; but others said, 'We want to hear you concerning this at another
time.'®
When they heard Paul's teaching concerning the Resurrection, some Athenians perhaps influenced by Epicureanism — found it absurd. Others were more polite
but one can, perhaps, detect some ridicule in their case as well. If one confuses
the teaching concerning the resurrection which the more familiar Greek doctrine
of Reincarnation, one might well image an eternal return of the same image of
Paul endless repeating his teaching concerning the Resurrection!
Setting aside the actual hostility of the Athenian public as well as Athensinfluenced philosophers to the Christian doctrine of salvation, there are, in fact.

1848 (the "spring of Nations") and the loss of the Papal States in 1870 as a consequence of the growing
power of the movement under Garibaldi to create a united Italian state. The existence of the roman
Church was more severely challenged by the Enlightenment, Communism, and the rise of the nation
state than it had ever been by the Reformation. See Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin, The Papacy in the
M odem Wor/cf (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970).
®Luke Acts o f the Apostles. 17:32. In Haenchen, Ernst. The Acts of the Apostles: A Commentary
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1971).
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deep seated antagonisms between the classical educational ideal and that
associated with the Catholic intellectual tradition. Catholic thinkers commonly
assume that their tradition represents the development of the ancient
educational ideal. In fact, it does not. Properly seen, the educational ideal of the
ancients is, in many respects, opposed to the Catholic educational ideal.
I will, first, explore the main points of opposition and, after that, contrast
the Catholic educational ideal with that of liberal modernity. In this way, I hope to
develop my thesis concerning the controversial character of the Catholic
educational tradition.
Tensions and Conflicts between the Classical and Catholic Educational Ideals

W

hat, then, are the main points of opposition between the
Catholic educational ideal and that of antiquity? First, the
catholic educational ideal is that depicted in the lives of the

saints who are themselves, in turn, seen as the realization of the free self-sacrifice
of Jesus Christ. The activity of the saints cannot be understood as education
[Paideia) in the Greek sense. Paideia is the achievement by the citizen of the

mean {meson) in thought and action and the exercise of virtue (Arete). A re te is
shown by the self-discipline which allows one to make right choices in everyday
life and to find enjoyment in the successes one achieves in competitions with
one's fellow citizens for the goods of social life.
The Greek educational ideal assumes a competition between citizens for honor,
wealth, social standing and expensive pleasures. The Catholic educational ideal
does not rest on this foundation. What is important for the Catholic is not that
those prizes for which one competes with ones fellow citizens but the creation of
a community in which one shares all the available goods with ones brothers and
sisters and in which each is readily to sacrifice himself for the sake of the
community.^

^ Cf. Paul's Letter to the Philippians. 3:12-4:1 in Paul's Letter's from Prison: Philippians, Colossians,
Philemon, and Ephesians edited byJ.H. Houlden (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1970).
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Although self-sacrifice is part of the Greek educational ideal, it does not,
unlike the Christian, take the form of a blood offering for the sake of a spiritual
community. Socrates, e.g., must sacrifice himself in order to keep his promise to
the Athenian state. Socrates personifies the Laws and they speak to him thus
when he contemplates escaping prison:
"You are breaking the commitments and agreements that you made with
us without compulsion or deceit and under no pressure of time to
deliberate."®
Socrates hears the laws saying the following: We have given you every
opportunity — almost seventy years! — to decide whether you and I are in
agreement. Do you find the life that you lead in Athens good, Socrates?
Apparently, you do! You have settled in Athens and have raised your children
here. If you had come to the conclusion that Athens was not good, you could have
left us at any time and have taken your property with you. But you did not do this.
By staying here you implicitly concluded a contract with us Socrates. You
promised to obey the laws of the city — whether they are just or not.
"Is your wisdom such as not to realize that your country is to be honored
more than your mother, your father, and all your ancestors, that it is more
to be revered and more sacred, and that it counts for more among the gods
and sensible men, that you must worship it, yield to it, and placate its anger
more than your father'." ®
The State is closer to you and holier, Socrates, say the Laws, than father, mother,
and ancestors. Should you cause it anger, you must try to calm it — even if you

®Plato, Crito. in Five Dialogues, edited by G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing
Company, 2002), p. 55 (Stephanus 52 d-e).
®Plato, Crito. in Five Dialogues, edited by G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing
Company, 2002), p. 54 (Stephanus 51 a-b).
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intended no harm. In no case should you react in anger to its anger. The anger of
the state must simply be endured.
Thus spoke the Laws to the platonic Socrates. Socrates must sacrifice
himself but not for the sake of the common good. Socrates has, in fact, no
intention of sacrificing himself for the good of his fellow citizens. His sacrifice is
tragic in the specifically Greek sense. There was no honorable way out.
For the Christian, on the other hand, the most honorable sacrifice is
precisely for the good of one's fellow man.
"Greater love hath no man than this that he lay down his life for his
friends."^°

The self-sacrifice of Christ is, for the Christian, the perfect gift of love. For the
ancients, on the other hand, the self-sacrifice of Socrates is the primary example
of fidelity to the laws and the long-awaited solution to the Antigone problem
concerning the relative standing of state and family.^^ The State comes first
because the State is the greater educator.
"Did we not, first, bring you to birth, and was it not through us that your
father married your mother and begat you? Tell us, do you find anything to
criticize in those of us who are concerned with marriage? . . . Or in those of
us concerned with the nurture of babies and the education that you too

“ John 1 5-13, in The New Jerusalem Bible: Standard Edition edited by Henry Wansbrough (New York:
Doubleday, 1999).
“ Sophocles, Antigone, in Thebian Plays, edited by Peter Meineck and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis,
Indiana: Hackett, 2003), p. 126 and p. 128. Cf. Heeel. Phenomenology o f Spirit translated by A.V. Miller
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) §451, p. 270; §457, pp. 274-275; §475, p. 288. According to Hegel, the
debate which comes to expression in Antigone is, ultimately, between two forms of law. Antigone
represents the divine, underground, unwritten, feminine law of private life. Her uncle and antagonist,
Theban King Creon, stands for the earthly, worldly, expressly stated, masculine law of public life. See
also, Hegel's Philosophy o f Right, translated by T.M . Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.
328 ff. and 315 ff. (Remark § 166)
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received? Were those assigned to that subject not right to instruct your
father to educate you in the arts and in physical culture?"^^
The education which Socrates received from his parents is that which the state
ordered them to provide. Socrates' parents were simply carrying out the Athenian
educational program; the origin of their every educational impulse was the state.
The state is, above all, according to the platonic Socrates an educator —
and the supreme one. The Laws are, similarly, and above all, institutions which
socialize and the citizenry and which allow them to participate in rational life. The
educational function performed by the sake is the ground of our obligation to
obey the laws. Of course, if the state educated us poorly, our obligation is
relatively weak.
The citizen is, in fact, in a position to independently decide whether the
state did a good job in educating him. One can detect one's own lack of selfcommand as well as be aware of one's discontent in the performance of one's
state assigned duties. There are criteria for assessing the state as educator. But
that the state is to fulfill this role is fundamental to the Hellenistic educational
ideal. The laws not only bring about education, their supreme goal is to inspire a
feeling of devotion to the laws as is illustrated by the case of Socrates.
Greek legal obedience is not of the "my country right or wrong" variety. It
does, however, have affinities to the similar sounding but very different formula
of the German-American politician Carl Schurz. Schurz is reported to have stated
during the heat of a Senate debate:
"The Senator from Wisconsin cannot frighten me by exclaiming, "My
country right or wrong." In a sense I say it, too. My country is the great
American Republic. My country right or wrong. If right, to be kept right and
if wrong, to be set right."^^

Plato, Crito, in Five Dialogues, edited by G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing
Company, 2002), p. 53 (Stephanas 50 d-e).
Cited in Hans Trefousse, Carl Schurz: A Biography (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998).
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To be true to country is not to be blind to the content of the commands to which
the State demands one's obedience. One may certainly criticize these commands.
But, in the last analysis, one must remain true to the state - even when one
believes it to be in error. One has a made a covenant with the state to obey its
laws. The laws are expressions of the principle to which one owes not only all the
good things of life, but one's very life as something which is worth living.
A Christian cannot affirm that the State is the source to which one owes
every good and perfect gift. The Christian thanks God for his life.
"Every good and perfect gift comes from above, coming down from the
Father of the heavenly lights, which don't change like shifting shadows."^'^
Everything to which we must give thanks comes to us from God the Father. His
gift giving does not waver but is always present from age to age. The Christian's
first object of loyalty is, therefore, God on whom we can always rely.
"We have the power of loving, because He first had love for us."^^
Our love of God is to be understood according to the principle of reciprocity. We
would never have arrived at the Idea of loving God, had God not loved us first.
God sacrificed himself for the sake of the community to which we belong. The
impulse from which everything good which is given us proceeds is from God.
Education, for the Christian, is one such good, but not the highest.
The divine gift of education is, first and foremost, a gift of educators. Some
are called to be educators; others are called to different tasks for the sake of the
spiritual community.

“ Epistle of James 1:17 in The Epistle o f James: A Commentary on the Greek Text edited by Peter Davids
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: W m . E. Eerdmans, 1982).
1 John 4:19 in The New Jerusalem Bible: Standard Edition edited by Henry Wansbrough (New York:
Doubleday, 1999).
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"And God hath set first apostles, secondarily, prophets, thirdly, teachers,
after that miracles, the gifts of healing, helps, governments, diversities of
tongues."^®
Paul recognizes a diversity of divine gifts. They are all, however, purposive. They
are all designed to serve the Church and the people of God. In comparison with
the Greeks, we must, therefore, conclude that education is relativized by the
Christian by being regarded as one divine gift among others as well as
instrum entalized, i.e., associated with the purpose of creating the kingdom of

God. In addition, the Christian does not - with one conspicuous exception associate the laws with education. Education is primarily the task of the Church
since the main thing that the human being must learn is the doctrine of salvation.
Sacred doctrine is understood as the saving message of Jesus Christ (the "good
news") which is transmitted by the Church through countless teaching documents
such as the Apostle's Creed as well as Church encyclicals in the exercise of its
teaching function.
Law itself is understood by the Christian in accordance with the well-known
definition of Aquinas.
"Law is an ordinance of reason for the sake of the common good prescribed
and publicized by he who has regard for the good of the human
community."^^
Laws are commands. They presuppose a commander who bears responsibility for
the prosperity of the community. The king is elected for that purpose by God
himself. His ordinances are not instructions but concrete means of benefiting the
community. Human beings are needy and the one who bears responsibility of the
flourishing of the community has the task of making himself aware of what his

1 Corinthians 12:28 In Reading the Letters of Saint Paul: Study. Reflection, and Prayer by Thomas
Carolyn (Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 2002).
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoloaica. question 90, article 4.
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people need. The king might, so to speak, become an expert on the needs of his
people. His task is to concern himself with their needs and to use the power of
the state to satisfy them.
One is obliged to obey the law, Aquinas asserts, insofar as the law in
question is genuine.
"Human law has the nature of law insofar as it pertains to right reason...
But insofar as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the
nature not of law but of violence."^®
A genuine law is the expression of properly functioning reason and, in particular,
the properly functioning reason of the lawgiver. An unjust law, by contrast, is not
reasonable. It is divorced from the good of the community and the principles of
the right use of practical reason. An unjust law is violent. It is a way of threatening
men with harm by means of penalties which are invariably connected with their
non-compliance. These penalties properly serve to create and preserve the
community and to insure that individual persons do not let themselves be led by
their corrupt desires. Unjust laws, by contrast, compel people to perform unjust
acts. An unjust law is, therefore, a means of corrupting both men and society.
It is, by contrast, a duty to act in accordance with just laws. One should try
not merely to act in accordance with just laws but to do so in conscience. One
should educate oneself in the spirit of just laws. In fact, to develop oneself
morally with regard the laws is a duty. The laws are, according to Christian
teaching, not so much teachers as objects of education.
The main exception to general separation by Christians of Law and
education, as I alluded to above, concerns the divine law. The divine Law,
according to Aquinas, includes the commands of the Old Law — the Ten
Commandments — and the New Law instituted by Jesus Christ. The old law has
an educational function in as much as it makes the human being aware of his
sinful condition.
^ Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoloaica. question 93, article 3, reply to objection 2.
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"What should we say? Is the law sin? Certainly not. Indeed, I would not
have known what sin was except through the law. For I would not have
known what coveting really was if the law had not said, do not covet."^'

It was the Law and, specifically, the Old Law that makes me ware of my sinful
character. Had the Law not said, "you shall not covet thy neighbor's wife," I would
have not been aware of my own disordered desires in this area. The man learns
by means of the old Law that he is not what God intended him to be. This
teaching is not propositional but is a matter of self-knowledge.
The self-knowledge provided by the Old Law is not, however, identical to
that commanded by the Delphic oracle: "G nothi Sethon". The saying inscribed on
a column in the forecourt of the temple of Apollo at Delphi concerns the limits
and vulnerability of the human being (in contrast to the gods). Insight into the
limits of the human being is, in fact, the main message of Socrates.
"What is probable, gentlemen, is that in fact the god is wise and his
oracular response meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing, and
that when he says this man, Socrates, he is using my name as an example,
as if he said: 'This man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates,
understands that his wisdom is worthless."^°
Socrates presents himself as a divine instrument for humbling humanity. In his
pride man pursues — whether in politics, poetry, or craftsmanship — a
superhuman wisdom. The Delphic oracle uses Socrates to make the limited
character of human wisdom clear to men. Only he is wise who, like Socrates,

Paul, Letter to the Romans, 7:7, In Paul's Letter to the Romans edited by J.C. O'Neill (Harmondsworth,
England: Penguin Books, 1975).
Plato, Apology, in Five Dialogues, edited by G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, Indiana, 2002), p. 27
(Stephanus 23 a-b).
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knows his lack of wisdom and seeks that form of wisdom which is commensurate
to man.
The Modernist Challenge to the Catholic Educational ideal

S

elf-knowledge in the context of the Christian doctrine of salvation is
knowledge of the sinful nature of every impulse that proceeds from
us — save those tempered by divine grace. One's own entanglement

in evil is the essence of human self-knowledge according to the Catholic
educational ideal. This self-knowledge is the starting point for the doctrine of
salvation which is the heart of the Catholic ideal of education. Without knowledge
of the misery of a life lived aliened from God, sacred doctrine loses its point. Just
as one must know that one is sick in order to commit to seek a doctor, so must
the human recognize his misery in order for the rescue effected through Jesus
Christ to have any validity.
But precisely this presupposition is lacking in modern liberal educational
doctrine. The liberal educational ideal presupposes, to the contrary, that the
human being is good by nature and that any defect in the human condition must
be attributed to the social institutions which man has developed. As the founder
of a persuasive teaching concerning the goodness of human, Jean Jacques
Rousseau is seen to be the founder of the liberal educational ideal and his Emile
or on Education as the programmatic work of the liberal educational tradition.

In this article I am going to concentrate on the work of a recent follower of
Rousseau, John Rawls. Rawls was active in an American context closely
resembling our own. Rawls' educational program is, consequently, far more
recognizable to us that that of the eighteenth century thinker to whom Rawls is,so
deeply indebted. Rawls' main work, in my opinion, is A Theory o f Justice which
was published in 1971. Rawls' masterpiece has had vast impact on many aspects
of our social life. In philosophy, Rawls represents a turn from meta-ethics to a
renewal of the social contract tradition founded by John Locke and substantially
modified by Rousseau. In economic theory, Rawls represents a move way from

13
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utilitarianism in favor of a welfare economics which concentrates on the
condition of those groups in society who receive the least advantage from their
membership in society. In social theory Rawls represents a turn from
individualism to an ontology of shared ends. A social form is, according to Rawls,
not merely a collection of individuals but a community which recognize shared
ends and which works together to achieve them.
"Human beings have in fact shared final ends and they value their common
institutions and activities as good in themselves. We need one another as
partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the
successes and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complementary
to our own good.
The human being is not divided from his fellow man as isolated individuals
exclusively interested in their private interests. Rather man is a social being who
needs his fellow man not Just as a means of achieving his ends but as a partner in
a common way of life which is valued for its own sake. The human being can have
no real enjoyment of life as long as his fellow man is suffering. The failures of his
fellow man as well as his successes concern him.
Our thesis, however, concerns education. Is there an ideal of education
associated with this conception of social unity? By all means! The conception of
oneself as a being that is connected to his fellow man in a common form of life
which one values for its own sake, presupposes an educational process and a
complex one at that. This process begins, as it did for Socrates, with the State. But
the similarities between the classical Ideal and Rawls' liberal ideal go no further.
If one lives in a just state, one comes to recognize one's fellow man, or, more
specifically, fellow citizen, as a partner in a shared way of life. In a just society
everyone regards himself as having a certain dignity and, in fact, the same dignity
as every other citizen. This dignity is grounded in one's political being. As a citizen

John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 522523.
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and as a man one is recognized as a being that has certain rights. These rights are
not natural; they do not pre-exist the political condition. The rights of men and
citizens are, according to Rawls, social and, at the same time, inseparable from
him. They are not, in short, dependent on social vicissitudes.
"Every person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the
welfare of society as a whole cannot override.
Civil rights are not separable from individual citizens; they are not natural but rest
on the social structure as such and regarded as a whole. A society is founded on
strife as well as cooperative working together.
".. .a society is a more or less self-sufficient association of persons who in
their relations to one another recognize certain rules of conduct as binding
and who for the most part act in accordance with them."^^
Rawls conceives society as a unity of human beings with diverse interests. They
are unified with reference to principles of justice which provide them with the
means of resolving their conflicts. The resolution of conflicts which is grounded on
the principles of justice is final. It does lead to further conflicts. Citizens do not in
the resolution of their conflicts lose their separate interests. They do not
subordinate their interests to the common good. But they recognize that the
resolution provided by the principles of justice is fair and gives rise to a social
framework in which they can profitably pursue their interests within their
separate plans of life.
Unlike the Greek polis, Rawlsian society is not founded on competition.

-

There is, indeed, limited completion between individuals in society. But at the
founding social level - at the level of what Rawls calls the basic social structure —
there is exclusively cooperation. Moreover, competition between individuals or

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 3.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 4
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groups in society does not, for Rawls, have as its goal the promotion of the moral
excellence of the citizen {Arete). Competition is simply the means by which one
acquires what one needs to realize one's plan of life.
The foundations of society, however, presuppose cooperation between
persons and not competition. The human being must learn how he is to conduct
himself in relation to his fellow man in order to avoid mutually and socially
destructive conflict. Every form of egoism, for example, is, according to
requirements of social cooperation (or what Rawls calls social union) is excluded. I
may not conduct myself as if only my interests counted. Rather, I must recognize
that social cooperation is the necessary condition for any rational pursuit of selfinterest.
"Now B can accept A's being better off since A's advantages have been
gained in ways that improve B's prospects. If A were not allowed his better
position, B would be even worse off than he is. The difficulty is to show that
A has no grounds for complaint. Perhaps he is required to have less than he
might since his having more would result in some loss to B. Now what can
be said to the more favored man? To begin with, it is clear that the well
being of each depends on a scheme of social cooperation without which no
Could have a satisfactory life. Secondly, we can ask for the willing
cooperation of everyone only if the terms of the scheme are reasonable.
The difference principle, then, seems to be a fair basis on which those
better endowed, or more fortunate in their social circumstances, could
expect others to collaborate with them when some workable arrangement
is a necessary condition of the good of all."^^

With regard to a social system which rests on the principle of cooperation, i.e.
one in which one could, hypothetically, freely and on the basis of good reasons
and ones "capable of determining the intellect" to choose to participate (as
^'‘ John Rawls. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge. Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 103.
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opposed to simply resigning oneself to one's social condition as a fixed and
immutable given)^^ the question arises concerning the justification of a principle
of justice, i.e. the difference principle, which requires the most favored members
of society to renounce advantages which they might otherwise be able to a right
to enjoy had the society reached an agreement to alternative principles of
distributive justice.
Rawls' answer to this question is the crux of the famous Rawls-Nozick
debate. It is, Rawls argues, justified for the state to deny the claim of the most
favored members of society to advantages which they might be able to possess
had an alternative conception of justice been adopted as the basis of social union.
The stability and duration of a political society depends on the free and rationally
grounded affirmation of its principles of justice. The main question, therefore, is
not whether the system of social cooperation is optimal for a member of society
or a group on the basis of a comparison of what he or it might have been able to
obtain in an alternative arrangement. This question presupposes that the
interests of the individual or the group have primacy over that of society as a
whole viewed from a moral point of view. The question of social justice is
concerned with the structure or composition of a social system which is optimal
from the standpoint of a "suitable defined initial situation"^^ i.e. with respect to a
standpoint of uncertainty in which one is not in the position to determine what is
(or is not) advantageous for oneself or one's group with respect to alternative
social arrangements. Rawls calls this point of view the "original position." The
main characteristic of this standpoint is that it is one in which one calculates
"behind a veil of ignorance."^^

"First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social
status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets

John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism in The Basic Writings of iohn Stuart Mill. Edited by J.B. Schneewind
(New York: Modern Library, 2002), p. 237 "General Remarks").
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 118.
John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 136.
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and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does
anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan
of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to
risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the
parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That
is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of
civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the
original position have no information as to which generation they
belong."^®
Behind the "veil of ignorance" no one knows anything which could in the least
way distort their reflections. The contracting parties have the task of discovering
fair principles of justice for regulating the basic structure of an industrial society
possessing democratic political institutions and practices. Were they to know
anything about their individual situations, they would try to design the social
system in a way that would systematically advantage themselves (and their
descendents). The parties do not have social consciences; they want what is best
for themselves (and their descendents). As Rawls puts it: the relation between the
contracting partners is one of "mutual disinterestedness" or "limited altruism."^^
They are not egoists because their interests are not exclusively private. But
neither are the contracting parties altruists. For they are not willing to put the
achievement of their plans in the slightest jeopardy much less to sacrifice their
plans (or themselves) for the sake of the common good (or any other presumed
higher goal. The parties take their own purposes realized in the execution of their
plans of life seriously. They regard the fulfillment of their plans as desirable and as
sufficient to bestow meaningfulness on their existence.
The most important part of the educational program associated with
Rawlsian liberalism consists in the development of normative structures which
transcend the rules or precepts associated with given social formations and which
can make a justified claim to universality. Rawls deals with the question of the
^^John Rawls. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 137.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 146.
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emergence of moral norms and, specifically, norms of justice in "The Sense of
Justice," the Eighth Chapter of his A Theory o f Justice. There Rawls offers a sketch
of a three-stage process of moral development. The first is an Authority-oriented
morality and is similar to the general Christian account of the origin of our
obligations to God.
"The child comes to love the parents only if they manifestly first love
him."^°
The child obeys its parents because its parents have provided it with countless
benefits. The rules which the parents put forward to regulate the child's behavior
are accepted by the child as ones which it ought to adopt on the basis of an
implicitly acknowledged principle of reciprocity. We ought to respond to those
who affect us in kind: to love those who love us and to hurt those who hurt us.
The benefits showered by the parents on the child are expressions of their love.
The child's adoption of the rules prescribed by the parents for the regulation of its
behavior as norms is the way by which the child loves the parents in turn.
Although the child, strictly speaking, lacks the resources to reciprocate for the
material benefits conferred by the parents in kind, it can obey the rules which its
parent's prescribe. Obedience to the rules seems, in fact, to please the parents
very much in the way in which the child is delighted by toys and the like.
Reciprocity is, therefore, realized by means of the child's obedience to parentally
prescribed norms.
The second stage of moral develop consists, according to Rawls, in a grouporiented morality. One accepts the rules acknowledged by the other members of
the group to which one wishes to belong because conformity to these rules is a

,

condition of membership. Membership in the group consists in the recognition of
the obligatory character of the rules prescribing right conduct. One shows that
one accepts a behavioral norm when one, e.g., adheres to it even when doing so
contradicts one's private interests. The impulse to do what the group requires
^°John Rawls. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 463.
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even when one could obtain greater benefits through non-compliance is not
irrational. Persons learn to value the goods which are only obtainable through
participation in group practices. These are true goods. The person who treasures
the experience of playing in a well-played game has, according to the Aristotelian
principle, true enjoyment one based on human nature. According to this principle,
the human enjoys the development of his talents.^^ If participating in a complex
game such as baseball counts as an activity which affords the human being
opportunities to develop his talents (as it must), then playing baseball may be said
to count as a true pleasure. Such pleasures are not, however, to be had unless all
participants in the game resolve to abide by the rules.
The third and final stage of Rawls' scheme of moral development is called
the "morality of principles." In this case, one is concerned not with the rules of
existing social practices but with norms regulating the basic structure of society
which would be affirmed by free and equal moral persons in an initial situation of
equality.
"[The original position is designed so that] the principles that would be
chosen, whatever they turn out to be, are.acceptable from a moral point of
view. The original position is defined in such a way that it is a status quo in
which any agreements reached are fair. It is a state of affairs in which the
parties are equally represented as moral persons and the outcome is not
conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of forces."^^
The principles of justice are those which would be chosen in a suitable original
position, i.e. as one which can be taken to represent the moral point of view. The
fundamental idea of Rawlsian ethics is "pure procedural justice."
".. .pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion
for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 424433 ("The Aristoteiian Principle").
^^John Rawls. A Theory o f Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 120.
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outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the
procedure has been correctly followed."
Pure procedural justice obtains whenever we are prepared to say that any
outcome generated by a procedure is ipso fa c to right and just - regardless of its
precise character and, specifically, regardless of the way in which it impacts
affected parties. The outcome is right, we want to argue in cases of pure
procedural justice - just because it arises from this procedure. The procedure,
one might say, lends its "rightness" to the outcome.
Rawls owes his concept of pure procedural justice to his reflections on price
theory. Just as, according to neoclassical price theorists, any determination of the
price of commodities generated by a well-regulated market will be just regardless
of its utility function,^'^ so Rawls puts forward a theory of justice in which any
principle which can be agreed upon by suitably described rational subjects of
choice to regulate the basis of their association will count as the basic principles
of social justice. Although the relation between Rawls' theory of justice and
Jevons's neoclassical price theory is merely one of resemblance, it does allow us
to see the origins,of Rawls' way of thinking about justice in the history of ideas. In
fact, Rawls was very influenced by neo-classical economic theory and, indeed,
expresses gratitude to the founder of the neoclassical Chicago school, Frank H.
Knight, for the decisive impetus which led him to develop his idea of the original
position.^^ Knight provided the definitive statement of the neoclassical theory of
competition. According to the doctrine of Chicago school of economic science,
"competition" designates the pursuit by at least two agents (or economic
subjects) of a single goal whereby the success of one party is inverse to the failure
of the other and vice versa. Similarly, in cases where one party achieves the goal ,
only in part, the other party is excluded from achieving success to exactly the

John Rawls. A Theory o f Justice (Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 86.
^ William Stanley Jevons, The Theory o f Political Economy (Whitefish, Montana: Kessinger Publishing
Company, 2008) This is a facsimile reprint of the 1911 revised edition published by Macmillan and
Company, London. The original edition of Jevons's Theory appeared 1871.
Thomas W. Pogge, John Rawls (Miinchen: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1994), p. 23.
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same degree and vice versa.^^ The ethics of competition, according to Knight and
the Chicago school rests on a distinction between two objects of moral judgment.
One can assess the moral character of the acts of individual competing agents or
one can assess the system of competition on which theses acts are founded. The
principle of assessment is not, according to Knight, the same. The assessment of
individual actions and social systems rests on diverse norms.^^ Rawls expresses
the relevant meta-ethical principle as follows:
"The correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that
thing.""®
The principle or norm according to which one judges the rightness of a thing
depends on its mode of being. Since individual agents and social systems
constitute two distinct modes of being, the principles for assessing them must
also be different. It follows that although there may, according to our rules for
assessing individual agents, be "winners" and "losers," it is, nonetheless possible,
given the essentially distinct rules for assessing the basic social structure that
everyone be a winner. Rawls' definition of society as a "cooperative venture for
mutual benefit" is not — from the standpoint of the rules for assessing the social
system — unrealistic, unlikely — much less, given the existence of capitalist
society, absurd."® A well-ordered system of cooperation which is advantageous
for all of its members is completely realistic. We can arrive at principles for
regulating a social order in which membership would be advantageous for all. If
the institutional formations of such an order are realizable given our inherited
institutions and practices and when these latter are, in turn, deeply rooted in our
moral sensibilities, then a well-ordered, mutually advantageous society would

Frank H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1935,
pp. 345-359.
Frank H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935,
pp. 345-347 (footnote).
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 29.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 84.
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constitute a social ideal to which a given, historically conditioned people could
orient itself.
Rawls, as we have seen, appropriates the neoclassical distinction between
the qualities of individual actions within a social system and the qualities of the
system as such in his theory of social justice. Although there may be vast
differences between the levels of wealth, income, chances of gainful
employment, marketable skills between some citizens of an economic liberal
democratic state and others, these differences are not, Rawls will argue,
necessarily unjust. Considered from the standpoint of Rawls calls "ideal theory"
and with regard the basic structure of society such a society may, nonetheless, be
advantageous for all.'^® Unlike Hobbes and Locke, Rawls does not justify
inequalities by introducing the idea of a state of nature. Rawls, in fact, dismisses
the concept of a non-political human condition as a fiction. The human being is,
for Rawls, political — not in the sense of a being who finds its completion in the
collective life of the polis as one finds in antiquity, but as a being which always
finds itself in one political order or another. How one finds oneself in society,
according to Rawls, affects one's existence and identity. Society can hurt a man
very deeply — not just by denying him goods which makes it impossible for him to
realize his dreams but by injuring his self-esteem so completely that he no longer
dreams. The worst fate of a man, for Rawls, is not to believe that one's goals are
worth realizing. Massive inequalities between the advantages which diverse
citizens receive from society are, for Rawls (as for Marx) the origin of this self
alienation.
"[The basic structure of society] contains various social positions and . . .
men born into different positions have different expectations of life
determined, in part, by the political system as well as by economic and
social circumstances. In this way the institutions of society favor certain
starting places over others. These are especially deep inequalities. Not only

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 8f and
Cf. 245f, 351.
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are they pervasive, but they affect men's initial chances in life; yet they
cannot possibly be justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or
desert."''^
The basic structure of a complex, industrialized, modern democratic society must
be assumed to authorize massive inequalities between its citizens. Some citizens
are found to enjoy great advantages from social union as measured by the index
of primary social goods; others receive significantly fewer advantages from their
participation in civil life. To the contrary, modern industrial society expects its
least advantaged members to bear the heaviest burdens of social life. The
relatively disadvantaged must, so to speak, pay the costs of social union but
receive little or no remuneration. Inequalities in the basic social structure have far
reaching consequences. They do not merely affect one's share of the primary
social goods but one's self-conception. The self-image of the least advantaged
members of society is essentially that of a slave. The least well-off believe that
their lives are less valuable than those of the better-off members of society. They
believe, moreover, that their plans of life — to the extent that they even
construct such plans are not merely led like animals by the impulses of the
moment — have no particular urgency. The least well-off are quite prepared to
set their plans aside in order, for example, to serve the more advantaged. In a
word, the least well-off members of modern industrial democratic society lack
self-esteem. They don't believe that the execution of their plans of life is justified
with reference to their own existence but see themselves as means by which the
plans of the well-to-do or, even, society as a whole, are realized.'^^
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts; Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 7. In ^
opposition to Marx, however, Rawls does not root the self-alienation of man — which he, moreover,
explains as a loss of self-esteem — in the class character of society. Cf. A Theory of Justice. § 67 ("SelfRespect, Excellences, and Shame").
There are many sociological studies of the psychological effects of the inequalities permitted by the
basic structure of a modern, industrial democracy and, specifically, the United States. One might
recommend: Christopher Jenks, Inequality: an Reassessment o f the Effects of Family and Schooling in
America (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Jonathan Cobb and Richard Sennett, The Hidden Injuries of Class
(New York: W .W . Norton, 1993); James Lardner, David A. Smith, and Bill Moyers, Inequality Matters: The
Growing Economic Diyide in America and its Poisonous Consequences (New York: The New Press, 2007);

24

The Catholic Educational Tradition
But although Rawls recognizes the extent of the injury which social
inequality causes the members of society which who receive the lowest share of
those benefits made possible by virtue of the existence of a system of social
cooperation, he, nonetheless, argues that a society with massive inequality in the
distribution of social and economic goods — although admittedly not perfectly
Just — can be pronounced just in the sense of "nearly just."'^^ Rawls contends that
a society with massive inequalities is, in spite of that fact, just if and only if it
possesses a social structure which rests on principles of justice which would be
rationally preferred to any alternative principles by free, equal and moral persons
in an initial situation would could plausibly be said to offer an interpretation of
the moral point of view. Such a "reasonably just" (Rawls should have said
"reasonably unjust") society is, therefore, to be rationally preferred to alternative
social structures which perhaps offer greater equality in the distribution of basic
goods but are not derivable from the original position, i.e. from the standpoint of
Rawlsian social justice.'^'^
The question of whether Rawls' fiction of the original position is itself to be
rationally preferred to the fiction of the state of nature will not be explored
here.'^^ It suffices to note that Rawls has developed a theory of justice that
justifies economic competition between rationally self interested agents. Unlike
utilitarian thinkers such as Adam Smith and his followers, Rawls does not directly
justify such competition by appeal to the principle of social prosperity but with
reference to moral principles and, specifically, principles of justice."^® The
internalization of these principles presupposes a process of moral development
D. Stanley Eitzen and Janis E. Johnson, Inequality: Social Class and its Consequences (New York:
Paradigm Publishers, 2009); and Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in American Society (New
York: Harper Perennial, 1992).
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 351.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.351.
Nor will I explore the question of whether the foundations of social justice should rest on fictions of
whatever form. Cf. Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy o f As If: A System of the Theoretical, Practical, and
Religious Fictions of Mankind on the Basis o f an Idealistic Positivism (London: Routledge, 2008). This is
C.K. Ogden's translation of the sixth German edition of 1920. The text first appeared in 1911.
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, edited by Edwin Canon (New York, The Modern Library, 1937).
Smith's magnum opus was originally published by the firm of W. Strahan and T. Cadell in London in
1776.
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which will be similar to yet, nonetheless, distinct from the educational model
associated with utilitarianism. The utilitarian model of moral education aimed at
repressing every tendency in the human being to pursue mere caprices of private
interest in order that one might emerge as an economic agent capable of
pursuing one's "enlightened self-interest" as a member of a free and democratic
social order.^^ Rawls' ideal of moral education, as we have already seen,
culminates, by contrast, in a "morality of principles." Principles, according to
Rawls, do not have reference to a final good — even that of the common social
good — but to an initial problem situation or aporia in which they function —
much as marijuana, nicotine, LSD, alcohol, or anaerobic exercise — as tension
relievers."^^
A morally mature person, according to Rawls, conforms to principles, i.e. he
acts in accordance with rules of conduct which can make a claim to be valid for
any other person who finds himself in similar circumstances. Since any claim to
universalizability presupposes reflection on whether the proposed act is, in fact,
not merely internally or logically consistent but, for Rawls, following Kant,
expresses respect for moral personality, i.e., acknowledges the fact that every
person as a rational being is properly an object of respect, and, finally, tends to
bring about an agreement of wills {volonte general) in a possible kingdom of ends
considered as a "realm of nature,"''^ a "morality of principles" will be the basis of

Adam Smith, A Theory o f the M oral Sentiments, edited by Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002). Smith's account of the psychological foundations of a general system of morals
was first published by the firm of A. Millar in London in 1759. Cf. also John Stuart Mill, On Liberty in The
Basic Writings o f iohn Stuart Mill, Edited byJ.B. Schneewind (New York: Modern Library, 2002), Chapter
IV ("Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual").
It should be noted that relaxants create dependencies. They do not, moreover, get rid of tensions but
merely relieve the associated symptoms. One who employs such devices creates, thereby, an obstacle to
any knowledge of the underlying conflict. If Rawlsian principles operate like relaxants, then they also
obviate self-knowledge. See Ann Hartle, Self-Knowledge in the Age o f Theory (Lanham, Maryland:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1996)
'*®John Rawls. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 251257. Kant proposes to use the idea of a "realm of nature" as a regulative idea to "bring about that which
is not actually real but which could become real through our actions." Kant, Foundations of the
Metaphysics o f Morals, edited by Robert Paul W olff and translated by Lewis White Beck (New York:
MacMillan Publishing Company, 1969), p. 33.
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a reflective or critical ethics. A moral person, moreover, acts autonomously; his
decision to act from universalizable principles is not founded on any necessary
end.
"Kant held, I believe, that a person is acting autonomously when the
principles of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible
expression of his nature as a free and equal rational being. The principles
he acts upon are not adopted because of his social position or natural
endowments, or in view of the particular kind of society in which he lives or
the specific things he happens to want. To act on such principles is to act
hereronomously."^°
One acts autonomously when the rules of conduct on the basis on which one
reaches a decision can be regarded as expressions of one's moral nature. To
determine oneself with respect to one's moral personality is, for Rawls,
incompatible with any identification of oneself with a purpose associated with a
given social institution or one grounded in a merely given natural property or
capacity which one happens to possesses. Every non-moral determination of the
personality which conditions the choice of a rule of action can only be regarded as
heteronymous. When one acts hereronomously, one acts as if one could not
estrange oneself from one's merely given condition. But an autonomous person
knows better. He knows that every quality which a person possesses apart from
those associated with moral personality can be severed from a man without
distorting his nature in any respect. By contrast, any subordinate of a man to a
final end always implies an injury to human nature. A moral education is,
therefore, one in which one detaches oneself from natural and social
contingencies concerning, e.g., one's god-given talents and abilities or bodily
characteristics as well as one' social station and role.

^°John Rawls. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 252.
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"Moral education is an education in autonomy."^^
A moral education — which, for Rawls, is only a part of the complete education of
the person (although that part of greatest importance from a political viewpoint)
— aims at the formation of autonomous persons. Autonomy implies
emancipating oneself from any purpose, social relation, friendship, or bodily
characteristic or capacity whose injury or loss might be regarded as an injury or
loss to oneself. As Hegel points on in his discussion of negative freedom, an
education in autonomy in the Rawlsian sense is an alienation of oneself from
every concrete determination.^^ With respect either the ancient or the Catholic
educational ideals, the goal of freeing oneself from one's own contingencies is
nothing short of abhorrent. The liberal educational ideal would, e.g., allow
Socrates to walk out of prison, after his friend and rich patron Crito had bribed
the guards, without the slightest demur of his D aim on. Socrates' relation to
Athens is, from the standpoint of the liberal ideal of autonomy, a mere
contingency of his Thrownness. From the standpoint of the Catholic educational
ideal, liberal autonomy negates the relation between the believer and God. The
believer must put his profession of faith in brackets in order to assent in good
faith with his fellow citizens to the principles of justice which form the basis of the
liberal social order. According to the Catholic educational ideal, the realization of
human nature moves beyond the achievement of moral personality toward the
ultimate re-unification with God.
"You have made us, o Lord, for thyself and our hearts are restless until they
rest in Thee."^^

^^John Rawls. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 516.
Hegel, Philosophy of Right, translated by T.M . Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), §5. For
Hegel, negative freedom is actuated by a mere solitary idea whose realization is nothing but the fury of
desolation. Hegel's notion of negative freedom looms large in Michael J. Sandel's critique of Rawls. Cf.
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
Augustine, Confessions. Book One, In Augustine, Confessions: Books l-XIII. Francis J. Sheed (trans.)
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993) (ca. 397-398).
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God, according to the Catholic doctrine of salvation, made man for himself. He
made man so that man might dwell in God's proximity. Not that God was lonely
and had no friends but because it suited the perfection of God to create a
creature in which He would be united with material creation. Every human
impulse considered with respect to its God-created nature is drawn to the vision
of God {Visio beatifica). This pursuit has, indeed, has been damaged by original sin
and every sin which precedes from the individual human being, moreover, forms
an additional obstacle to the fulfillment of this God-given purpose. But through
the grace of God the innate desire for God becomes ever stronger. Whether one
consciously pursues the goal which God intends for the individual agent or not,
human life is, collectively and individually, led, as if by an invisible hand, to God.
It is, therefore, obvious that the liberal educational ideal sets itself in
opposition to the Catholic educational ideal. Even in the work of a rather serene
liberal thinker like Rawls one finds expressions of a deep hostility to the Catholic
educational ideal. Rawls, for example, describes the Thomistic, and, in fact, the
Christian, conception of the final end of human life, or happiness, as consisting in
the vision of God as "irrational" and "crazy."
"Although to subordinate all our aims to one end does not strictly speaking
violate the principles of rational choice . . . , it still strikes us as irrational, or
more likely as mad. The self is disfigured and put in the service of one of its
ends for the sake of system."^^
Rawls concedes that, in accordance with his own conception of reason, a
teleological ethic of the Thomistic variety cannot be called irrational. But the
appeal to his own principles is not, in this case, sufficient for this system-aspiring
thinker and he goes on to assert on purely intuitive grounds that Thomistic ethics
is, nevertheless, irrational in the sense of being crazy. Anyone who acts (or seeks
to act) for the sake of a highest goal damages his own moral personality since
moral personality must always conceive itself as free to pursue something other
^^John Rawls. A Theory o f Justice (Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 554.
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than a fixed final goal — something that presumably spontaneously reveals itself
in the course of experience.
The Response of Catholic Thinkers to the Liberal Educational Ideal
he "openness" of liberal autonomy which, in fact, references an

T

emptiness in the soul is discussed from the standpoint of the
classical educational ideal by Allan Bloom in his best-seller from the

late 1980s The Closing o f the A m erican M in d : H o w H igh er Education has failed
D em ocracy and Im poverished the Souls o f Today's Students (New York: Simon and

Shuster, 1987). There are, similarly, numerous critics of the liberal ideal of
autonomy who proceed from the standpoint of the Catholic educational ideal
although these have scarcely enjoyed the market success of Bloom. The Troian
Horse in the City o f God: The Catholic Crisis Explained written by the German

Catholic philosopher and theologian Dietrich von Hildebrand may be regarded as
exemplary with respect to the Catholic critique of liberalism. Many writings of the
current Pope, Benedict XVI, who as a young priest, incidentally, knew von
Hildebrandt personally at the University of Munich might also be recommended
for this same purpose.^^ Pope Benedict XVI engaged in a face-to-face conversation
with one of the most important contemporary liberal thinker, Jurgen Habermas
published in English as The Dialectics o f Secularization: On Reason an d Religion
(San Francisco, California: Ignatius Press, 2006). In my opinion, confrontations
between representatives of the contemporary liberal educational ideal and those
of the Catholic educational tradition are most desirable. Although the Church
powerfully set itself in opposition to Communism, its relation to the liberal
educational ideal is anything but clear. In fact, some Catholics are of the opinion
that many of the pronouncements of the second Vatican Council, and, specifically,
its Declaration on Religious Liberty (Dignitas H um an ae), the Roman Church

For example, Joseph Kardinal Ratzinger, Glaube— Wahrheit— Toleranz, Fourth Edition (Freiburg im
Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2004).
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appropriate important aspects of the liberal educational ideal,^® According to this
self-criticism in the contemporary Catholic Church, the Roman Church has already
taken many steps in the liberal direction which, if taken further, could lead to the
end of the Catholic education tradition and its assimilation into liberalism.^^ With
regard this critique of an alleged liberalizing trend in the contemporary Church, I
have in mind some prominent spokesmen of the Society of St. Pius X. and,
specifically. Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre.
Pope Benedict XVI recently lifted the excommunication of several Bishops
ordained by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre but, at the same time, ordered them to
acknowledge the consistency of the second Vatican Council's declaration of
religious liberty with the Catholic educational tradition.^® One could, of course,
ask whether an obligation — and, in fact, a Holy obligation as required by piety —
to affirm a dubious notion of religious freedom on the part of obviously uncertain
Lefebvrists is itself compatible with the idea of religious freedom. If religious
freedom is understood in the manner of the liberal education ideal, one must
conclude that Pope Benedict's action contradicted the idea of religious freedom
and, so, if the teaching of Vatican II concerning religious liberty represents an
accommodation of the liberal educational ideal, one would have to conclude that ,
the Pope in demanding the assent of the Lefebvrist Bishops to the principle of
religious freedom as betokening their acceptance of the authority of the Papal
office on matters of faith and morals had fallen into a practical contradiction. For
the liberal understanding of freedom of conscience precisely excludes the use of
force to compel acquiescence to a proposition which do not reflect the sincere
convictions of the individual human being. Freedom of conscience is, according to
the liberal educational ideal, an indefeasible right; persons may not be required to
.give an account of their religious creed to other human beings, to representatives

For example. Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, / Accuse the Council, Second Edition (Kansas City, Missouri:
Angelas Press, 1998).
Rama P. Coomaraswamy, The Destruction o f the Christian Tradition (London: Perennial Books, 1981).
Catholic News Agency. January 24, 2009, "Pope Benedict lifts excommunication of Bishops ordained
by Lefebvre."
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of the church, or to society as such.^^ The question posed by Pope Benedict's XVI
demand for assent on the part of the Lefebvrist Bishops is not, however, one of
freedom of conscience (which D ignita H um an ae, of course, explicitly affirms). It
concerns, rather, the Bishop's special vow of unconditional obedience to the
Pope. The Bishops made a solemn vow to always be obedient to the Holy Office
and this pledge is not, according to the Catholic doctrine of salvation and the
explicit language of the Declaration on Religious Liberty, lower-ranking than the
general human right to religious freedom. The subject of religious freedom,
according to the Declaration, is the inviolability of the religious practice of the
individual believer — whether Catholic or not. Its range of application does not
transcend political society where it implies a strict prohibition of the use of
violence by civil authorities to compel professions of allegiance to religious
orthodoxy in a confessional states. Religious freedom does not, according to
D ignita H um an ae negate the sacred duty of men and civil societies to affirm the

doctrine of salvation announced by Jesus Christ and amplified by the Roman
Catholic Church in its teaching function and the one Church of Christ as the
presence of the kingdom of God amidst the various communities and associations
established by sinful man.^° There is no freedom of conscience within the Church
to reject sacred doctrine on the basis of one's sincere convictions. The Church's
teaching concerning salvation is the gift of God which alone frees us from our
entanglement in sin. Respect for the decision of the individual believer to accept
or reject the Catholic educational doctrine properly concerns the deliberations
which lead to the profession of faith. But once one has affirmed this teaching and
thanked God for its effects in one's soul any disavowal of Holy teaching amounts
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty in The Basic Writings o f John Stuart Mill. Edited by J.B. Schneewind (New
York; Modern Library, 2002), pp. 10 ("Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion"). Mill refers in the above
to "the great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses." The architects of the
liberal ideal of religious freedom and freedom of conscience include: Erasmus, Enchiridion militis
Christiani (1503); Montaigne, Essays (1575) Bodin, Colloquium of the Seven about the Secrets of the
Sublime (1588); Spinoza, Tractatus Theoloaico-Politicus (1670); Locke, Letter on Toleration (1689);
Voltaire, Philosophical Letters on the English (1733); Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws (1748); Lessing,
Nathan the Wise (1779); and Goethe, Maxims and Reflections (1829)
Austin Flannery, Ed., Vatican II. Volume I: The Concilliar and Postconcilliar Documents (Northport, New
York; Costello Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 799-812.
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to apostasy. There is, in fact, freedom within the Church to discuss the legacy of
the second Vatican Council — particularly with regards the relation between the
liberal and Catholic educational ideals but this freedom always presupposes the
reflective assent to sacred doctrine and a steadfast allegiance to the law of life it
authorizes, renews, and sustains.
Were the roman Church to understand freedom of religion and conscience
in Rawls' manner, it would signify, on the one hand, a determinate highest-order
interest that persons must protect above all else and upon which their selfpreservation entirely depends but whose specific content, on the other hand, is
blanked out insofar as one is capable of adopting the moral point of view.
"The question of equal liberty of conscience is settled. It is one of the fixed
points of our considered judgments of justice.. .it seems evident that the
parties must choose principles that secure the integrity of their religious
and moral freedom. They do not know, of course, what their religious or
moral convictions are, or what is the particular content of their moral or
religious obligations as they interpret them. Indeed, they do not know that
they think of themselves as having such obligations. The possibility that
they do suffices for the argument, although I will make the stronger
assumption."®^
The principle of equal liberty of conscience is, for Rawls, indefeasible; it stands
beyond the realm of what may be legitimately discussed in a liberal legal order
founded on principles of justice. The very existence of the person depends on his
capacity to engage in free, rational deliberation with himself when he is of "two
minds" in order that he may reach his ow n decisions. It is on the basis of one's
ow n thoughtful judgments — one's considered judgments of right, justice, value,

and virtue — that one forms one's identity. The person must have freedom of
conscience, i.e. the right to be able to convince him self o f th e soundness of a

Cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 206
and passim § 33 ("Equal Liberty of Conscience").
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given conclusion on the basis of his ow n intuitions and through his ow n use of
rational principles of choice if he is to develop a moral personality. To be forced to
draw a conclusion from fear of the consequences of dissent from authoritative
teachings, by contrast, injuries the person in his depth. Affirmations of
authoritative teachings (as well as repudiations of heterodox doctrines) founded
on fear of sanctions make the person incapable of self-determination. Coerced
decisions can never expression one's personality. Since self-determination is
based on utterances and deeds which bring one's inner convictions to self
expression in a rational and freely chosen plan of life (on the basis of which one
forms a life history), and since the dignity of persons is based on the acknowledge
of their right to self-determination, it follows that respect for persons implies the
renunciation by persons generally and by political societies in particular of the use
of force in the interests of religion or public morality by persons.
Although Rawls' explanation of the grounds of the right of equal freedom of
conscience appears to be consistent with and, indeed, as it understands itself, a
continuation and revision {aggiornam ento) of the declarations of a human right to
tolerance in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries by the founders of the
liberal educational tradition,^ it cannot be brought into agreement with the
Catholic educational tradition.^^ As Rawls astutely saw, the principle of tolerance
as it emerged in the aftermath of the Reformation and the subsequent Wars of
Religion of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries signified the renunciation the
search for a religious solution — with reference to the big institutional religious
communities (Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed, among others) claiming jurisdiction
in one or more of the spheres of social life in association with the emerging
political structures — to the questions of social, political, and, finally, personal

®^John Rawls. Political Liberalism (New York. Columbia University Press, 1993), Introduction. ("The
historical origins of political liberalism (and liberalism in general) are, therefore, the Reformation and its
consequences such as the prolonged battles concerning religious tolerance in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries."
Nor can Rawls' account of the grounds of the grounds of religious freedom be made compatible with
the moral philosophy of Kant — as Rawls claims throughout A Theory of Justice). John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 11 and passim § 40 ("The Kantian
Interpretation of Justice as Fairness").
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unity. The separation of religion from political life regarded as a condition for the
possibility of cultural unities would, in fact, be disputed by adherents of the
Catholic educational tradition. The privatization of religion implies a division in the
mind {Gem ut; anim us) between its representations of its divine destiny and its
representations of its destiny as a member of the civil order. Both kinds of
representations, however, belong together, according to Catholic moral doctrine,
as aspects of our faculty of desire.®^
Every self-aware American Catholic is familiar with the strain of the polarity
of worldly and an otherworldly orientations [Bestim m ungen) and every American
Catholic who takes responsibility for his mistakes, character, weaknesses,
strengths, and other moral characteristics tries somehow, however
unsatisfactorily, to cope with it.®^ In fact, from the standpoint of the Catholic
educational tradition, the tension between the eternal and temporal callings is a
wound which can only be healed through the g r a c e . T h e separation of religion
and politics — as well as the polarities of human and divine law - is not,
^ With regard its rejection of the restriction of religion to the private sphere, the Catholic educational
can appeal to the authority of Kant. Cf. Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Koniglich-PreuRische Akademie
der Wissenschaft, 1900), Volume 12, Brief Nr. 671: Brief an Sommering," 10 August, 1796, p. 30.
“ Cf. John Tracy Ellis, American Catholicism (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1969).
With respect to the question of the dependence of any release from the entanglements of sin on the
grace of God, the Catholic educational tradition parts company, after taking a brief walk together, with
the teaching of Kant and his followers. According to Kant, moral action must form the starting point for
any liberation of the human being from the bondage of sin. Grace, for Kant, is something that a moral
person — i.e., one who has strived to conform the maxim of one's act to the demands of universal
legislation — has a right to think that he deserves. For Kant, grace belongs to the realm of hope. The
person who wills to be moral has a good will and has a right to wish to be happy. If reason ruled the
world, moral virtue would always be crowned by happiness. Since we must represent God as the ruler of
an order of reason, we must think of Him as striving to reward moral virtue with happiness. The moral
person must believe that God finds morally virtuous actions pleasing and, therefore, as appropriate
objects of divine grace. Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of M ere Religion and other Writings.
translated by Allen Wood, George Di Giovanni, and Robert Merrihew Adams (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999). Kant's moral doctrine is often thought by Catholic moral thinkers to resemble
the pelagian heresy of the Fifth Century challenged, most memorably, by Augustine in his Contra
lulianum (421 or 422). See Augustine, Contra lulianum in Answers to the Pelagians III. Roland J. Teske
(trans.) (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press, 2003)(421 or 422).Emil Hoehne, Kants Pelaaianismus and
Nominalismus: Darstellung und Kritik (Leipzig: Doerffling und Franke, 1881)
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according to Catholic salvation doctrine, something which should simply be
allowed to stand as an inescapable feature of human life. The human being
cannot, it is true, escape this dilemma by the exercise of his own powers. He can,
it is true, deny the polarity, but it does not, thereby, go away. He can, equally,
narcotize himself but in doing so he merely denies himself the experience of the
symptoms of the tension — puts them, so to speak, behind a veil — but the
underlying causes remain as before. Nor is the dilemma solved by repressing one
or the other poles since both belong to his being. Finally, the tension is not
resolved by raising it up to a higher level by means of a Hegelian synthesis. As
characteristics of the original sin, the division of politics and religion is so deeply
rooted in human nature that the human being cannot sufficiently free himself
from its effects — not even in the mental realm {Geist) — to bring about such a
synthesis. Man is only undamaged from original sin to the extent that he can
know in a purely intellectual way that he is fallen and not what he was created to
be. But this knowledge does not suffice to free himself from his admittedly
deficient stage. Even if he uses his understanding to conceive a plan for
transforming his social or natural environments, his efforts will fall short of the
goal he seeks. If he tries — as he is commanded by natural law — to improve his
world (and himself), his efforts will miscarry due to the inadequacies of those he
is trying to help to profit from his measures or his own inadequacy to exercise the
virtue necessary to carry it out. From a religious point of view, the tension
between religion and politics is a consequence of human sinfulness and, by no
means, a principle of right. From a political view point, by contrast, the survival of
religion is itself somewhat mysterious. Despite the numerous attempts to
determine the social and psychological functions of religion and to produce
substitutes for traditional religions founded on a sense of the sacred, there
remains a longing for something which the human creations are unable to make
present.®^

Max Horkheimer, Die Sehnsucht nach den aanz Anderen: Ein Interview m it Kommentator von Hellmut
Gumnior (Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1970).
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I hope I have convinced you to see the Catholic educational tradition as one
which is under attack from two sides. The opponents, however different in other
respects, have, nonetheless, a certain similarity. Both demand something which
flatly contradicts the Catholic profession of faith and, specifically, sacred doctrine.
Both set an idol in the place which the Catholic education tradition reserves for
God. The ancients called this idol "my city" {to polis). The Greek citizen was
required by virtue of its sacred tie to the state to subordinate and, if necessary
sacrifice, all other human bonds — whether of family, religious community,
private association, or to their own bodies. The liberal educational ideal proposes
different idol that that of the state, but its conception of an entirely harmonious
social order in which all citizens can preserve an image of themselves as free and
equal and, at the same time, as unique individuals pursuing their separate plans
of life and, thereby writing their own life stories, nonetheless, seen from the
standpoint of the Catholic educational tradition, is, in fact, an idol as well. The
mode of collective social life demanded by a liberal political order as depicted in
John Rawls' A Theory o f Justice requires the citizen to subordinate and, if
necessary, to sacrifice all other affiliations which might prevent them from
participating in the political order of a democratic society in that it requires the
citizen to internally free himself from all concrete attachments — including those
associated with his self-interest - as is required by the adoption of an initial
situation of choice which can be interpreted as the moral point of view. The
Catholic educational tradition puts itself in opposition to its opponents not as
idolaters but as men who have erred in one respect or another but who, in virtue
of their God given reason, are capable of correcting themselves. Apart from the
grace of God, all men err. The human way is a meandering path filled with
seeming detours and blind alleys. But human error — just as well-ordered human
acts and products — leads to God.
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